Introduction
Alexander Swoboda is recognized for many important contributions to exchange rate economics. One of the less known is the fact that he is the father (grandfather? godfather?) of the bipolar view -that is, of the idea that capital mobility creates pressure for countries to abandon intermediate exchange rate arrangements in favor of greater flexibility and harder pegs. Looking back on his contributionsto this literature (Swoboda 1986, Genberg and (Swoboda 1987a, b) , it is hard to know whether to group him with the hawks or doves. 2 The hawks argue that international capital mobility fatally undermines the viability of intermediate regimes.
It makes it more difficult to maintain both monetary independence and an exchange rate target. Insofar as monetary independence has value, the result is adoption of a more flexible exchange rate. And insofar as the stability offered by an exchange rate target has value, the result is a tendency to seek monetary unification with like-minded partners.
While the doves acknowledge that that capital mobility complicates the operation of intermediate arrangements, they resist the conclusion that it creates irresistible pressure to move to the poles. As in other economic settings where agents trade off two objectives, 2 an interior solution may be optimal. In the present context this means striving for a degree of monetary independence that is less than complete and a degree of exchange rate stability that is less than perfect. This interior solution will be characterized by managed flexibility. The exchange rate will have to be more flexible than when capital mobility is absent, in which case it is possible to have monetary independence without compromising currency stability, but free flexibility is not required. The middle may have to be defined more liberally -in addition to pegged but adjustable rates and narrow bands it now must include managed floats and wide bands. Subject to this caveat, however, capital mobility does not imply the need to abandon intermediate regimes.
It is unlikely that one more paper will produce a consensus on these contested issues, which have occupied Alexander Swoboda in the course of a long and productive career. But if nothing else, another look at the data will help the participants in this debate to refine their priors.
Another Look at the Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes
In this section I take another look at the evolution of practice with respect to exchange rate regimes, using two popular de facto classifications. The first one is produced by the staff at the International Monetary Fund. As described by Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) , this classification combines market exchange rates and other quantitative information with assessments of the nature of the regime drawn by IMF economists in the course of bilateral surveillance. Its advantage is that it is independently constructed; the author cannot be accused of having coded country regimes to his liking.
This series has now been updated through 2006. Its disadvantage is that, based as it is in part on input from the IMF's country economists, this series is not easily extended. The second classification is that of Reinhart and Roff (2004) , who provide a detailed description of their methods. This classification has been updated by the author in collaboration with Raul Razo Garcia. 3 Somewhat arbitrarily, most of the analysis here is conducted using the Bubula and Otker-Robe calculation. 4 Statements below refer to this classification except where noted to the contrary. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003) , Sturzenegger (2003, 2007) and Shambaugh (2004) . 4 Comparisons suggest that the analysis undertaken here is not particularly sensitive to the measure of de facto exchange rate regime used. This is what we found in Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006) . Where it is sensitive is with respect to the choice between measures of de facto and de jure regimes. And the arguments above apply to de facto regimes. The IMF has long published a series for countries' official (self-announced) exchange rate regimes. Alesina and Wagner (2003) provide an analysis of why de jure and de facto regimes might differ. Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006) describes the derivation of these matrices. Appendix 3 of that paper also presents modified matrices constructed on the basis of estimates of how various covariates affect the likelihood of regime transitions. Those matrices together with assumptions about the evolution of the covariates allow us to relax the assumption that transition probabilities are independent of country characteristics, and they allow us to apply alternative assumptions about how the key characteristics evolve over time. 10 Something that the author has argued will most likely remain the case (Eichengreen 2007) . 11 Not too much should perhaps be made of this point, which is a function of the fact that a growing number of European countries adopted the euro starting in 1999. Implicit here is the question of whether this tendency for countries to gravitate toward the Euro area could shift into reverse in the future. and political development, they will.
But another alternative to a pegged exchange rate as an anchor for monetary policy is inflation targeting. A number of advanced countries and emerging markets have been able to move away from soft pegs by installing this alternative approach to the formulation and conduct of monetary policy that ensures not just price stability but also a 8 reasonably well behaved exchange rate as well. This argument is given further development below.
Determinants of Exchange Rate Regime Choice
This section inquires into the determinants of exchange rate regime choice. The point of departure for this analysis is the theory of optimum currency areas, which points to country size, openness and the asymmetry of shocks, among other variables, as shaping the choice between pegging and floating and -in the present context -between hard pegs, intermediate regimes, and floats. It follows a previous attempt by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) to bring that theory to the data. To explore the availability of alternatives to soft pegs, it follows Eichengreen and Taylor (2004) by extending this framework to incorporate the prerequisites for inflation targeting.
The focus is on the variability of the exchange rate between a pair of countries (as implicit in much of the optimum-currency-area literature). The exchange rate arrangement is measured by the volatility of the nominal bilateral rate over (centered)
five-year periods. 14 The results of analyzing real rates are very similar, since price levels display inertia and most of the variability in real rates over periods of five years or less derives from the variability of nominal rates. In focusing on actual exchange rate variability as a measure of the regime, the analysis parallels Ghosh, Gulde and Wolff 9 (2003) . Insofar as actual variability is the most important single consideration in most de facto regime classifications, it is consistent with the analysis in Section 2 above.
The basic specification relates the variability of the exchange rate to two measures of asymmetric shocks: the difference or asymmetry of output shocks (measured as the standard deviation of the difference in the change in log-GDP between the two countries), and the similarity or dissimilarity of export structures (as measured by the sum of the absolute differences in the shares of agriculture, mineral and manufacturing trade in total merchandise trade). In addition I consider the importance of bilateral trade linkages (measured as exports to the partner country, scaled by GDP, and averaged over the two countries) and the transactions costs associated with having a relatively variable exchange rate (which are assumed to decline with country size, measured here by the log of the product of real GDP of the two countries, in dollars).
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There is close conformance between the predictions of the theory and the results for the full sample (column 1 of Tables 5 and   6 ).
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The Another contrast arises is when the variability of the bilateral exchange rate against the dollar is included to measure the global (or regional) exchange rate regime.
For the period 1983-97 there is evidence that pegging to the dollar was an effective way for countries to peg to one another. (To put it another way, it appears that limiting the variability of dollar exchange rates was an effective way of limiting the variability of bilateral rates among third countries.) This effect is more strongly evident among emerging markets than advanced countries. This will not surprise those aware of the historical tendency for Asian countries, in particular, to stabilize intra-regional exchange rates by the use of dollar pegs. After 1997 the results for emerging markets are basically unchanged (long live de facto dollar pegging). But the coefficient for the advanced countries switches sign: for this subsample, greater stability vis-à-vis one another now is associated with less stability vis-à-vis the dollar. This is the monetary-union effect: EMU member states have effectively eliminated exchange rate variability among themselves while at the same time, as a result of the greater size and relatively lesser openness to the outside world of their union, learning to tolerate larger dollar fluctuations.
Inflation Targeting as an Alternative to Exchange Rate Targeting
One of the appeals of pegged exchange rates is thus that they provide an anchor and practical guide for monetary policy. Their corresponding limitation is that the anchor may not be well suited to the structure of the economy or the shocks to which it is subjected. Small countries are essentially forced to import the monetary policy stance of the larger country or countries to which they peg. Inflation targeting has emerged in recent years as an increasingly popular alternative. A stable price level (or a low rate of inflation) becomes the anchor for monetary policy. To implement this framework the central bank must be granted the independence and clear mandate to credibly commit to low inflation. It then issues an inflation forecast, explains how its policy settings map into the specified target, and provides an explanation for instances where the target is missed. 19 These steps should help to anchor market expectations and provide a mechanism for political accountability. Thus, in addition to independence and a mandate for price stability, transparency is required for the credibility of this regime.
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It is sometimes said that floating is not a monetary policy strategy; rather, it is the absence of a strategy. Thus, by providing a substitute strategy, inflation targeting should reduce the pressure to target the exchange rate. This suggests a positive relationship between inflation targeting and exchange rate variability as countries reduce their 19 Formally, inflation targeting can be defined as a monetary policy operating strategy with four elements: an institutionalized commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy; mechanisms rendering the central bank accountable for attaining its monetary policy goals; the public announcement of targets for inflation; and a policy of communicating to the public and the markets the rationale for the decisions taken by the central bank. Institutionalizing the commitment to price stability lends credibility to that objective and gives the central bank the independence needed to pursue it. Mechanisms for accountability make this pursuit politically acceptable and impose costs on central banks that are incompetent or behave opportunistically. Announcing a target for inflation and articulating the basis for the central bank's decisions allows these mechanisms to operate. 20 As credibility is gained, it becomes possible for the central bank to deviate from the inflation target temporarily as needed to damp short-run fluctuations in output and employment without undermining belief in its commitment to price stability. This then provides more policy flexibility than a simple exchange rate peg. Hence "flexible inflation targeting." reliance on pegs for the nominal-anchor function. Alternatively, one might argue that, in developing countries in particular, where exchange-rate-centered monetary policy strategies are likely to be fragile and lack credibility, adopting a more robust and credible alternative like inflation targeting may in fact reduce exchange rate volatility. Insofar as inflation targeting provides a credible anchor for expectations, investors have less reason to believe that current inflation is a leading indicator of future inflation. As expectations become regressive rather than extrapolative, speculation becomes stabilizing. Exchange rates should then settle down.
The fourth and fifth equations in Table 4 -and the corresponding specifications for the country and period subsamples-add a dummy variable that equals unity when at least one of the central banks in a country pair is classified as an inflation targeter.
Because inflation outcomes are likely to be affected by the behavior of the exchange rate-to put it another way, because countries do not opt for inflation targeting at random-I instrument inflation targeting using a measure of transparency (taken from Transparency International.) Policy transparency is an important dimension of a successful inflation targeting strategy, as noted above: it is important both for managing expectations and providing for political accountability. But not all countries are equally capable of implementing policy transparency; where transparency is integral to the functioning of social, economic and political institutions, an inflation targeting regime is more likely to be feasible. Such is the rationale for using transparency as an instrument for inflation targeting. For completeness, I report the results estimated both with and without the instrument.
14 The contrast between advanced countries and emerging markets is striking. In Table 4 , inflation targeting enters with a negative coefficient for the emerging markets, as if its stabilizing effect on expectations also stabilizes the exchange rate, although the coefficient loses its statistical significance when instrumental variables are used. That negative effect is driven by post-1997 experience (compare Tables 5 and 6 ). In Table 6 , which focuses on the 1998-2005 period, the negative coefficient on the inflation targeting dummy is statistically significant at standard confidence levels even when instrumented.
It is of course in the post-1997 period when most developing-country experience with inflation targeting is concentrated. That the coefficients for this subsample are therefore better defined makes sense.
Conclusion
The advanced countries have already abandoned the unstable middle. The results here suggest that growing popularity of inflation targeting may allow a growing number of emerging markets to follow them without exposing the converts to high levels of exchange rate volatility. ¹ Includes arrangements with another currency as legal tender, currency union and currency board and monetary union/monetary association. ² Includes conventional fixed peg to a single currency, conventional fixed peg to a basket, pegged within horizontal bands, forward-looking crawling peg, forward-looking crawling band, backwardlooking crawling peg, backward-looking crawling band and other tightly managed floating. Source: Author's estimates using Reinhart and Rogoff's exchange rate classification 1/ Includes arrangements with no separate legal tender, preannounced peg or currency boards, and preannounced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 2/ Includes de facto pegs, de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, preannounced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%, de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%, moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time), preannounced crawling peg, preannounced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, and de facto crawling peg. 3/ Includes managed floating and freely floating arrangements 
